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  1 - The Body-Soul Relation in the Transcendent Philosophy and Ibn Arabi’s School
  Mohammad Miri
  There are several similarities between the philosophical view of the Transcendent Philosophy and the gnostic view of Ibn Arabi’s school of the quality of the body-soul relation. Both of them, based on certain considerations, believe in the oneness of the body and soul. More

  There are several similarities between the philosophical view of the Transcendent Philosophy and the gnostic view of Ibn Arabi’s school of the quality of the body-soul relation. Both of them, based on certain considerations, believe in the oneness of the body and soul. At the same time, while accepting the existence of a huge gap between the rational soul and corporeal body, they emphasize that the existence of the steam-like spirit is not enough to establish the body-soul relation and argue that the existence of an Ideal body and level, which stands between the steam-like spirit and rational soul, is necessary for this relation to be realized. Accordingly, based on the views of both schools, the intellectual and rational soul possesses three bodies which appear alongside each other vertically. That is, it first belongs to the Ideal body, then to the steam-like spirit, and then to corporeal body. In other words, the rational soul administers the corporeal body through two intermediaries, namely, the Ideal body and the steam-like spirit. Moreover, both the Transcendent Philosophy and Ibn Arabi’s school explain the place of the rational soul, Ideal body, steam-like spirit, and corporeal body as the levels of the microcosm and the correspondence of each with the levels of macrocosm based on the principle of the “correspondence of macrocosm and microcosm”. Manuscript profile
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  2 - Subsistence of the Soul in School of Khorasan: Self-Knowledge in Mīrzā Mahdī Isfahānī, Shaykh Mujtabā Qazvīnī, and Ayatullah Murvārīd
  Ibrahim Alipour  Ghorbani Ghomi
  The School of Khorasan follows an anti-philosophy approach and believes in the separation of the fields of revelation, intellect, and gnosis from each other. It also attends to the surface meaning of religious texts and has a different view of the soul and its subsisten More

  The School of Khorasan follows an anti-philosophy approach and believes in the separation of the fields of revelation, intellect, and gnosis from each other. It also attends to the surface meaning of religious texts and has a different view of the soul and its subsistence. The advocates of this School believe that the soul is a delicate body which is different from the soul only in terms of its accidents. They also maintain that it receives certain perfections such as knowledge and intellect, which are luminar (nūrī), immaterial, single, and external realities, merely through Almighty’s blessing. Man will always remain a corporeal being not only at the moment of creation but also to the end of what they unite with. In the School of Khorasan, self-knowledge is a necessary introduction to demonstrating the subsistence of the soul so that immortality is considered to be secondary to the knowledge of the truth. The soul, which lives with the body in worldly life, continues its life in the intermediate world needless of the body and independently in a body-like form. However, it is returned to the worldly body in the Hereafter and is rewarded or punished alongside it. This view suffers from some problems as follows: 1) equating the soul with body requires spiritual and corporeal resurrections to refer to the same process; 2) the approach of this school lacks internal consistency at times, and some diversity and conflict of ideas can be observed there, and 3) some of the concepts and related problems have not been explained correctly. Following an analytic library method, the present study explains and evaluates the views of three prominent figures of this school regarding the truth of the soul and its subsistence. Manuscript profile
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  3 - Death in the View of Abul-ḥassan ‘Āmirī (with a Focus on its Historical Place)
  Einullah  Khademi
  20.1001.1.20089589.1402.13.4.2.5
  Death as one of the most definite and certain events in human life has always attracted the attention of numerous thinkers. Modern philosophers have shown special attention to it particularly in their discussion of the meaning of life. Abul-ḥassan al-‘Āmirī is one of th More

  Death as one of the most definite and certain events in human life has always attracted the attention of numerous thinkers. Modern philosophers have shown special attention to it particularly in their discussion of the meaning of life. Abul-ḥassan al-‘Āmirī is one of the thinkers in the Islamic tradition whose view of death is of great historical significance. ‘Āmirī mainly pays attention to death while focusing on sensory soul and defines death as the annihilation and separation of sensory soul from the body. He considers sensory soul as the link between the soul (as an immaterial thing) and body (as a material thing) that is annihilated along with the body at the time of death. However, the rational soul is not destroyed. It can be said that ‘Āmirī had a medical approach to the problem of death and was influenced by religious texts at the same time. From the philosophical and religious aspect, ‘Āmirī rejected the M‘utazilites’ view of death and used the term nuz’ (dying) in order to provide a more profound concept and understanding of death. He also presents some arguments for the immortality of the soul and, at the same time, benefits from the concept of “vision” and its different types for a better perception of death. He believes that fear of death is one of the obstacles to a deep understanding of death and maintains that the attention to the necessary joys of life and luminous world and a change of view of death are critical for a more accurate encounter with this issue. One of the weak points of ‘Āmirī’s discussion of death could be lack of a focus on different types of death, particularly voluntary death. Manuscript profile
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  4 - Aristotelean Roots of the Soul’s Corporeal Origination in Mullā Ṣadrā’s View
  Hamideh  Ansari Hassan Fathi Morteza  Shajari
  20.1001.1.20089589.1402.14.1.7.7
  Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of More

  Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of the soul). Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is corporeally originated. The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, including the trans-substantial motion, the principiality and gradedness of being, and the corporeal origination of the soul, have made it possible to demonstrate corporeal resurrection. Aristotle also believes that the origination of the soul is corporeal. However, the extent to which Mullā Ṣadrā is influenced by Aristotle’s ideas in this regard has never been studied so far. This paper is intended to explain the Aristotelean roots of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of corporeal origination following a comparative-analytic method. The findings of this study indicate that in defining the soul as a “natural and organic body” and, following it, considering the soul as a formal substance and a primary perfection of the body, as well as believing in the unitary synthesis of the body and the soul and the unity of the faculties of the soul, all indicating the corporeal origination of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā is under the influence of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s approach suffers from some ambiguity because of the existing implicitness in some of his words and not referring to an explicit standpoint regarding the principiality of existence or quiddity, presence of motion in substance, and gradedness of existence. Manuscript profile